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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 Every decade presents a few great cases that force the 
judicial system to choose between forging a solution to a major 
social problem on the one hand, and preserving its institutional 
values on the other.  This is such a case.  It is a class action 
that seeks to settle the claims of between 250,000 and 2,000,000 
individuals who have been exposed to asbestos products against 
the twenty companies known as the Center for Claims Resolution 
(CCR).0  Most notably, the settlement would extinguish asbestos-
related causes of action of exposed individuals who currently 
suffer no physical ailments, but who may, in the future, develop 
possibly fatal asbestos-related disease.  These "futures claims" 
of "exposure-only" plaintiffs would be extinguished even though 
they have not yet accrued. 
                     
0The CCR Companies are Amchem Products, Inc.; A.P. Green 
Industries, Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; Asbestos 
Claims Management Corp. (formerly known as National Gypsum Co.); 
CertainTeed Corp.; C.E. Thurston and Sons, Inc.; Dana Corp.; 
Ferodo America, Inc.; Flexitallic Inc.; GAF Building Materials 
Corp.; I.U. North America, Inc.; Maremont Corp.; National 
Services Industries, Inc.; Nosroc Corp.; Pfizer Inc.; Quigley 
Co., Inc.; Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co.; T&N, plc; Union 
Carbide Corp.; and United States Gypsum Co. 
 
 All of the CCR defendants stopped manufacturing 
asbestos products circa 1975.  The assets of the CCR companies, 
together with their insurance coverage, represent a significant 
portion of the funds that will ever be available to pay asbestos-
related claims. 
  The settlement, memorialized in a 106 page document, 
was not crafted overnight.  Indeed, more than a case, this is a 
saga, reflecting the efforts of creative lawyers and an extremely 
able district judge to deal with the asbestos litigation 
explosion.  Asbestos litigation has burdened the dockets of many 
state and federal courts, and has particularly challenged the 
capacity of the federal judicial system.  The resolution posed in 
this settlement is arguably a brilliant partial solution to the 
scourge of asbestos that has heretofore defied global management 
in any venue. 
 However, against the need for effective resolution of 
the asbestos crisis, we must balance the integrity of the 
judicial system.  Scholars have complained that the use of class 
actions to resolve mass toxic torts, particularly those involving 
futures claims, improperly involves the judiciary in the crafting 
of legislative solutions to vexing social problems.  These 
criticisms are not merely abstract; they are levied in terms of 
the fundaments of the federal judicial polity:  jurisdiction, 
justiciability, notice, and the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23. 
 This opinion addresses appeals of the district court's 
September 22, 1994, preliminary injunction, which prohibits 
members of the so-called Georgine class from pursuing asbestos-
related personal injury claims in any other court pending the 
issuance of a final order in this case.  The appellants 
("objectors") are three groups of individuals with aligned 
interests who challenge the district court's injunction:  the 
 "Windsor Group"; the New Jersey "White Lung Group"; and the 
"Cargile Group" (mesothelioma victims from California).  The 
objectors challenge the district court's jurisdiction (both 
personal and subject matter) over the underlying class action, 
the justiciability of the case, the adequacy of class notice, and 
the propriety of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23. 
 Although we have serious doubts as to the existence of 
the requisite jurisdictional amount, justiciability, adequacy of 
notice, and personal jurisdiction over absent class members, we 
will, for reasons explained below, pass over these difficult 
issues and limit our discussion to the class certification 
issues.  We conclude that this class meets neither the 23(a) 
requirements of typicality and adequacy of representation, nor 
the 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority.  In In 
re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.) [Hereinafter GM Trucks], cert. denied sub 
nom. General Motors Corp. v. French, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995), we 
held that, for settlement classes, the 23(a) requirements must be 
applied as if the case were going to be litigated.  We now hold 
that, because the 23(b)(3) requirements protect the same 
interests in fairness and efficiency as the 23(a) requirements, 
and because "[t]here is no language in [Rule 23] that can be read 
to authorize separate, liberalized criteria for settlement 
classes," id. at 799, the 23(b)(3) criteria must also be applied 
as if the case were to be litigated.  While the better policy may 
be to alter the class certification inquiry to take settlement 
 into account, the current Rule 23 does not permit such an 
exception. 
 Examined as a litigation class, this case is so much 
larger and more complex than all other class actions on record 
that it cannot conceivably satisfy Rule 23.  Initially, each 
individual plaintiff's claim raises radically different factual 
and legal issues from those of other plaintiffs.  These 
differences, when exponentially magnified by choice of law 
considerations, eclipse any common issues in this case.  In such 
circumstances, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b) cannot 
be met.  Furthermore, this amalgamation of factually and legally 
different plaintiffs creates problematic conflicts of interest, 
which thwart fulfillment of the typicality and adequacy of 
representation requirements of Rule 23(a).  Primarily, the 
interests of the exposure only plaintiffs are at odds with those 
of the presently injured:  the former have an interest in 
preserving as large a fund as possible while the latter seek to 
maximize front-end benefits. 
 This class also fails Rule 23(b)'s superiority prong. 
Even utilizing the management techniques pioneered by the Federal 
Judicial Center, we do not see how an action of this magnitude 
and complexity could practically be tried as a litigation class. 
This problem, when combined with the serious fairness concerns 
caused by the inclusion of futures claims, make it impossible to 
conclude that this class action is superior to alternative means 
of adjudication. 
  For the reasons we have preliminarily outlined, and 
which we will now explain in depth, we will vacate the district 
court's order certifying the plaintiff class and remand with 
directions to decertify the class and vacate the injunction.  We 
recognize that our decision undermines the partial solution to 
the asbestos litigation crisis.  However, in doing so, we avoid a 
serious rend in the garment of the federal judiciary that would 
result from the Court, even with the noblest motives, exercising 
power that it lacks.  We thus leave legislative solutions to 
legislative channels. 
 
I.    BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY   
 Reciting the background facts and procedural history of 
this case could consume pages by the dozen.  This history is, 
however, already well known.  It has been chronicled in the 
opinion of the district court, see Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 254-67 (E.D. Pa. 1994); in the Cornell Law 
Review, see Symposium, Mass Tortes:  Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 
Cornell L. Rev. 811 (1995); and has even surfaced on the 
Continuing Legal Education (CLE) circuit, see Legal Intelligencer 
(Philadelphia), Jan 31, 1996, at 34 (announcing a CLE Course on 
the "Lessons of Georgine").0  In short, the asbestos law world 
                     
0In addition to the Cornell Law Review Symposium, numerous 
articles have addressed the issues raised in this case.  See, 
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass 
Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343 (1995) (arguing for 
prudential limits on mass tort class actions and using this class 
action as a case study); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort 
to Administration, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 899 (1996) (discussing 
judicial review of mass tort settlements and focusing in part on 
 knows this case backwards and forwards.  We shall, therefore, set 
forth only the essentials. 
 
A.  The Genesis of the Case 
 This case arises against the background of an asbestos 
litigation crisis: 
 [This] is a tale of danger known in the 
1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of 
Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries 
that began to take their toll in the 1960s, 
and a flood of lawsuits beginning in the 
1970s.  On the basis of past and current 
filing data, and because of a latency period 
that may last as long as 40 years for some 
asbestos related diseases, a continuing 
stream of claims can be expected.  The final 
toll of asbestos related injuries is unknown. 
Predictions have been made of 200,000 
asbestos disease deaths before the year 2000 
and as many as 265,000 by the year 2015. 
 
 The most objectionable aspects of 
asbestos litigation can be briefly 
summarized:  dockets in both federal and 
state courts continue to grow; long delays 
are routine; trials are too long; the same 
issues are litigated over and over; 
transaction costs exceed the victims' 
recovery by nearly two to one; exhaustion of 
assets threatens and distorts the process; 
and future claimants may lose altogether. 
 
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 
418-19 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (quoting Report of The Judicial Conference 
Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos, 1-3 (1991)) (footnote omitted). 
 Seeking solutions to the asbestos litigation crisis, 
eight federal judges with significant asbestos experience wrote 
                                                                  
this case); Note, And Justiciability for All?:  Future Injury 
Plaintiffs and the Separation of Powers, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1066 
(1996) (addressing the justiciability of futures claims). 
 to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel"), 
urging it to consolidate all the federal asbestos litigation in a 
single district.  These judges argued that consolidation would 
"facilitate global settlements, and allow the transferee court to 
fully explore . . . national disposition techniques such as 
classes and sub-classes under Rule 23."  Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 
265 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  The MDL Panel 
agreed, transferring all pending federal court asbestos cases 
that were not yet on trial to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and assigning them to Judge Charles R. Weiner for 
consolidated pretrial proceedings.  See In re Asbestos Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. at 424. 
 After the MDL Panel transfer, steering committees for 
the plaintiffs and defendants were formed and commenced global 
settlement negotiations.  Judge Weiner appointed two of the class 
counsel in this case, Ronald Motley and Gene Locks, as co-chairs 
of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee.  Counsel for CCR were 
active participants on the Defendants' Steering Committee. 
 When these negotiations reached an impasse, class 
counsel and CCR began negotiations to resolve CCR's asbestos 
liability.  After a year of discussions, the two sides reached a 
settlement agreement, and then filed this class action. 
 
B.  Proceedings in the District Court 
 On January 15, 1993, the named plaintiffs filed a 
complaint on behalf of a class consisting of (1) all persons 
exposed occupationally or through the occupational exposure of a 
 spouse or household member to asbestos-containing products or 
asbestos supplied by any CCR defendant, and (2) the spouses and 
family members of such persons, who had not filed an asbestos-
related lawsuit against a CCR defendant as of the date the class 
action was commenced.0  Five of the named plaintiffs allege that 
they have sustained physical injuries as a result of exposure to 
the defendants' asbestos products.  Four named plaintiffs allege 
                     
0The complaint defines the class as follows: 
 
(a) All persons (or their legal 
representatives) who have been exposed 
in the United States or its territories 
(or while working aboard U.S. military, 
merchant, or passenger ships), either 
occupationally or through the 
occupational exposure of a spouse or 
household member, to asbestos or to 
asbestos-containing products for which 
one or more of the Defendants may bear 
legal liability and who, as of January 
15, 1993, reside in the United States or 
its territories, and who have not, as of 
January 15, 1993, filed a lawsuit for 
asbestos-related personal injury, or 
damage, or death in any state or federal 
court against the Defendant(s) (or 
against entities for whose actions or 
omissions the Defendant(s) bear legal 
liability). 
 
(b) All spouses, parents, children, and 
other relatives (or their legal 
representatives) of the class members 
described in paragraph (a) above who 
have not, as of January 15, 1993, filed 
a lawsuit for the asbestos-related 
personal injury, or damage, or death of 
a class member described in paragraph 
(a) above in any state or federal court 
against the Defendant(s) (or against 
entities for whose actions or omissions 
the Defendant(s) bear legal liability). 
 
 
 that they have been exposed to the CCR defendants' asbestos-
containing products but have not yet sustained any asbestos-
related condition.  On December 22, 1993, the settling parties 
stipulated to the substitution of Robert A. Georgine for Edward 
J. Carlough as the lead plaintiff, and the caption of the case 
has been changed accordingly.  See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257 
n.1.  We thus refer to the plaintiff class as the Georgine class. 
 The complaint asserts various legal theories, including 
(1) negligent failure to warn, (2) strict liability, (3) breach 
of express and implied warranty, (4) negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, (5) enhanced risk of disease, (6) medical 
monitoring, and (7) civil conspiracy.  Each plaintiff seeks 
unspecified damages in excess of $100,000. 
 On the same day, the CCR defendants filed an answer, 
denying the allegations of the plaintiffs' class action complaint 
and asserting eleven affirmative defenses.  Also on the same day, 
the plaintiffs and defendants ("the settling parties") jointly 
filed a motion seeking conditional class certification for 
purposes of settlement accompanied by a stipulation of 
settlement.0  Simultaneously, the settling parties concluded 
another agreement:  class counsel agreed to settle their 
inventories of pending asbestos claims -- claims that were 
                     
0Additionally, on January 15, the CCR defendants filed a third 
party action against their insurers, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the insurers are liable for the costs of the 
settlement.  The insurance litigation is still pending in the 
district court.  See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 
93-0215, 1994 WL 502475 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1994). 
 expressly excluded from the class action -- against the CCR 
defendants for over $200 million.   
 The stipulation of settlement purports to settle all 
present and future claims of class members for asbestos-related 
personal injury or wrongful death against the CCR members that 
were not filed before January 15, 1993.  The stipulation 
establishes an administrative procedure that provides 
compensation for claimants meeting specified exposure and medical 
criteria.  If the exposure criteria are met, the stipulation 
provides compensation for four categories of disease: 
mesothelioma, lung cancer, certain "other cancers" (including 
colon-rectal, laryngeal, esophageal, and stomach cancer), and 
"non-malignant conditions" (asbestosis and bilateral pleural 
thickening).  The stipulation provides objective criteria for 
medical diagnoses.  For those claimants that qualify, the 
stipulation fixes a range of damages that CCR will award for each 
disease, and places caps both on the amount that a particular 
victim may recover and on the number of qualifying claims that 
may be paid in any given year. 
 Claimants found to have "extraordinary" claims can be 
awarded more than the cap allows, but only a limited number of 
claims (three percent of the total number of qualified 
mesothelioma, lung cancer and "other cancer" claims, and up to 
one percent of the total number of qualified "non-malignant 
conditions" claims) can be found to be "extraordinary." 
Furthermore, the total amount of compensation available to 
 victims with such claims is itself capped.  Payment under the 
settlement is not adjusted for inflation. 
 The stipulation does allow some claimants who qualify 
for payment but are dissatisfied with the settlement offered by 
CCR to pursue their claims in court.  However, the stipulation 
severely limits the number of claimants who can take advantage of 
this option.  Only two percent of the total number of 
mesothelioma and lung cancer claims, one percent of "other 
cancer" claims, and one-half of a percent of "non-malignant 
conditions" claims from the previous year may sue in the tort 
system.  Although the plaintiffs are generally bound to the 
settlement in perpetuity, the defendants are not so limited. Each 
defendant may choose to withdraw from the settlement after ten 
years.   
 The claims asserted by the exposure only plaintiffs --
claims for increased risk of cancer, fear of future asbestos-
related injury, and medical monitoring -- receive no payment 
under the stipulation of settlement.  In addition, "pleural" 
claims, which involve asbestos-related plaques on the lungs but 
no physical impairment, receive no cash compensation, even though 
such claims regularly receive substantial monetary payments in 
the tort system. 
 On the other hand, the settlement does provide 
exposure-only and pleural claimants with significant benefits. 
First, the stipulation tolls all statutes of limitations, so that 
any claim that was not time-barred when the class action was 
commenced may be filed at any time in the future.  Thus, unlike 
 in the tort system, where pleural claimants may have to rush to 
file suit on discovery of changes in the lining surrounding their 
lungs (before their full injuries are known), under the 
stipulation claimants do not submit their claims until they 
develop an impairing illness.  Second, the stipulation provides 
certain "comeback" rights, so that claimants who have been 
compensated for a non-malignant condition may file a second claim 
and receive further compensation if they later develop an 
asbestos-related cancer.  It is estimated that almost 100,000 
claims will be paid under the settlement over the course of the 
next ten years.0 
 On January 29, 1993, Judge Weiner conditionally 
certified this opt-out class.  He then referred the matter to 
Judge Lowell A. Reed for the establishment of settlement 
procedures and the resolution of objections to the settlement. 
Judge Reed held hearings on a number of aspects of the case and 
issued several comprehensive opinions.  On October 6, 1993, he 
ruled that the court had subject matter jurisdiction and that the 
action presented a justiciable case or controversy.  See Carlough 
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  On 
October 27, 1993, he concluded that the proposed settlement 
satisfied a threshold level of fairness sufficient to warrant 
class notice and approved a notice plan.  See Carlough v. Amchem 
                     
0The terms of the Stipulation are discussed in greater detail in 
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 267-86. 
 Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  We summarize the 
highlights of these decisions in the margin.0 
                     
0First, Judge Reed rejected the objectors' contentions that 
exposure-only plaintiffs, who may not presently have sufficient 
physical harm to state a valid cause of action, lack standing to 
pursue this litigation.  Carlough, 834 F. Supp. at 1446-56.  He 
reasoned that Article III standing is not dependent upon the 
plaintiffs' ability to state a valid cause of action, but that it 
depends upon whether these plaintiffs have "suffered an injury in 
fact which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent 
rather than merely conjectural or hypothetical."  Id. at 1450 
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 
(1992)).  He concluded that "exposure to a toxic substance 
constitutes sufficient injury in fact to give a plaintiff 
standing to sue in federal court."  Id. at 1454. 
 
     Second, with respect to amount-in-controversy, Judge Reed 
noted that "the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the 
claim is apparently made in good faith," and the case will not be 
dismissed unless it appears to a "legal certainty" that the 
$50,000 amount cannot be satisfied.  Id. at 1456 (citations and 
internal quotations omitted).  He then rejected the objectors' 
argument that exposure-only plaintiffs did not meet this 
standard.  Judge Reed held first that "it is enough that the kind 
of factual injuries alleged by the exposure-only plaintiffs --
physical, monetary and emotional injuries -- plainly support a 
claim to more than $50,000."  Id. at 1459 (citation omitted).  He 
also ruled that, even if he were required to do a claim-by-claim 
analysis of the exposure-only plaintiffs' claims, it could not be 
said to a legal certainty that a jury might not award $50,000 to 
any plaintiff.  See id. at 1462. 
 
     Third, Judge Reed rejected the objectors' claim that the 
litigation was "collusive" -- and therefore did not present a 
case or controversy -- because the Stipulation of Settlement was 
negotiated before class counsel formally filed the  complaint. 
Id. at 1462-66.  He held that this case "is one involving 
genuinely adverse interests, but, because of the settlement, it 
lacks a dispute as to the remedy."  Id. at 1465. 
 
     On October 27, 1993, Judge Reed ruled that "the proposed 
settlement is fair for the preliminary purpose of deciding 
whether to send notice to the class in that it appears to be the 
product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, it has 
no obvious deficiencies, it does not improperly grant 
preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of 
the class, and it clearly falls within the range of possible 
approval."  Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 320 
  On February 22, 1994, after several months of pre-trial 
proceedings, discovery, and motions, Judge Reed commenced a 
hearing to assess the fairness of the settlement.  The hearing 
took eighteen days and involved the testimony of some twenty-nine 
witnesses.  On August 16, 1994, Judge Reed filed an opinion 
approving the Stipulation of Settlement and finally certifying 
the Georgine settlement class.  In the course of his opinion, he 
held that the class met the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and 
that notice to the class met the requirements of Rule 23 and the 
Due Process Clause.  See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 
F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).0 
  The settling parties then moved for a preliminary 
injunction barring class members from initiating claims against 
any CCR defendant pending a final judgment in this case.  On 
September 21, 1994, he granted the motion, explaining that the 
                                                                  
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (footnotes omitted).  He then analyzed the notice 
plan, concluding that the proposed notice (with certain specified 
modifications) "satisf[ied] the requirements of Rules 23(c)(2) 
and (e) and the due process clause of the Constitution." 
Carlough, 158 F.R.D. at 333. 
 
     Finally, Judge Reed rejected the objectors' contention that, 
regardless of the content or form of the notice plan, notice 
regarding potential future personal injury claims for past toxic 
exposure is per se unconstitutional, either because such 
claimants may not understand that they are members of the class 
or because they cannot make an informed opt-out decision without 
knowing what disease, if any, they may suffer in the future.  Id. 
at 334-36. 
0Judge Reed later established a new notice and opt-out period, 
voiding a prior notice and opt-out period, to remedy alleged 
improper communications made by counsel opposing the settlement. 
See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478 (E.D. Pa. 
1995). 
 injunction is necessary because "the cost and time expended 
defending claims in multiple jurisdictions would likely result in 
the disintegration of the Georgine settlement." Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 716, 723 (E.D. Pa. 1994). These 
appeals followed. 
 
C.  The Contentions on Appeal 
 Although this opinion will address only the class 
certification issues, these appeals have not been so 
circumscribed.  Indeed, far from acceding to any of Judge Reed's 
rulings, see supra note 6, the objectors have also vigorously 
pressed challenges to justiciability, subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over absent class members, 
and the adequacy of class notice. 
 First, the objectors argue that this is a feigned suit 
-- and thus is not a justiciable case or controversy under 
Article III of the Constitution -- because neither plaintiffs nor 
plaintiffs' counsel had any intention of litigating their 
"futures" claims, but merely seek approval of a result that 
plaintiffs and defendants have jointly pursued.  This contention 
is supported by the fact that class counsel presented the suit 
and settlement together with counsel for the CCR defendants in 
one package, after having negotiated with CCR a side-settlement 
of over $200 million for cases in their "inventory."  Second, the 
objectors contend that the exposure only plaintiffs lack standing 
to bring their claims because they currently suffer no actual 
injuries.  Third, they assert that the court lacks subject matter 
 jurisdiction over the exposure-only plaintiffs' claims because 
such claims cannot exceed the $50,000 minimum required by the 
diversity statute.  Fourth, they argue that the court cannot 
assert personal jurisdiction over class members lacking minimum 
contacts with the forum, because such class members have not had 
a meaningful opportunity to opt out and thus have not consented 
to jurisdiction.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 811-12 (1985). 
 Finally, the objectors have martialed a powerful three-
pronged argument that, in this futures class action with 
virtually no delayed opt-out rights, notice to absent class 
members cannot meet the requirements of Rule 23 or the 
Constitution.  See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  The objectors argue that notice is 
problematic for futures plaintiffs because (1) such plaintiffs 
may not know that they have been exposed to asbestos within the 
terms of this class action; (2) even if aware of their exposure, 
these plaintiffs, who suffer no physical injuries, have little 
reason to pay attention to class action announcements; and (3) 
even if class members find out about the class action and realize 
they fall within the class definition, they lack adequate 
information to properly evaluate whether to opt out of the 
settlement. 
 The settling parties counter these contentions, arguing 
that the jurisdiction of the district court is secure and that 
the strictures of due process have been satisfied.  First, to 
rebut the objectors' argument that this suit is feigned, the 
 settling parties point out that the district court's resolution 
of that issue in their favor rested largely on fact findings, and 
that this appeal does not challenge any factual determinations of 
the district court.  The settling parties also allege that, 
against the background of bitter adversarial litigation that has 
gone on for many years between plaintiffs and asbestos companies 
(and between counsel in this case), this suit was no more or less 
"collusive" than other similar actions brought and settled. 
Second, regarding the existence of the requisite amount in 
controversy, the settling parties cite to precedent (within a 
checkered body of caselaw) holding that claims for future injury 
and medical monitoring with accompanying emotional distress meet 
the jurisdictional threshold.0 
                     
0The settling parties also contend that a prior decision in this 
case, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993) 
[Hereinafter Gore], decided the jurisdictional challenges raised 
in this appeal.  We are unpersuaded.  After the Georgine class 
action had commenced but prior to the establishment of an opt-out 
period, the Gore plaintiffs (several absent members of the 
Georgine class) filed a class action complaint in West Virginia 
state court.  The Gore plaintiffs sought a declaration that they 
were authorized to "opt out" of the Georgine action on behalf of 
a West Virginia class and to initiate their own asbestos class 
action.  The district court granted a preliminary injunction as 
"necessary in aid of [its] jurisdiction" under the All-Writs and 
Anti-Injunction Acts, enjoining the Gore plaintiffs from 
prosecuting their separate class action.  On appeal to this 
Court, the Gore plaintiffs argued that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to enjoin them because the district court had issued 
the injunction before providing absent plaintiffs an opportunity 
to opt out of the Georgine class, which is necessary to establish 
personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs lacking minimum contacts 
with the forum, and before the district court found that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the Georgine action.  The panel 
upheld the district court's injunction because, after issuing its 
injunction, the district court established an opt-out period and 
found that it had subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 200-01. 
Although the district court should have inquired into its 
  Third, as to the adequacy of class notice, the settling 
parties submit that the class members, having the terms of the 
settlement before them, were in a better position to exercise a 
choice than the usual notice recipient who has no idea how the 
case will come out.  Finally, they assert, though far less 
convincingly in the wake of GM Trucks, that the requisites of 
Rule 23 are met as well.   
 Although the existence of justiciability and subject 
matter jurisdiction are not free from doubt, and although we have 
serious concerns as to the constitutional adequacy of class 
notice, we decline to reach these issues, and pass on to the 
class certification issues.  The class certification issues are 
dispositive, and we believe it prudent not to decide issues 
unnecessary to the disposition of the case, especially when many 
of these issues implicate constitutional questions.  See, e.g., 
                                                                  
jurisdiction before issuing the injunction, we held that the 
district court's subsequent orders constituted an "initial 
jurisdictional inquiry" necessary to support its preliminary 
injunction.  Id. at 201. 
 
 Given its unique posture, we read Gore very narrowly. 
Gore held that a district court may issue a preliminary 
injunction against an attempt to opt out en masse -- which 
threatens to completely undermine the federal class action --
without a full-scale determination of its jurisdiction.  Where a 
federal class action is threatened with destruction before the 
notice and opt-out period even commences, an "initial 
jurisdictional inquiry" -- which "may be based on the information 
reasonably and immediately available to the court," id. -- is 
sufficient to support the court's jurisdiction to issue a 
protective preliminary injunction.  Gore did not reach the 
question raised in this case:  the propriety of the district 
court's assertion of jurisdiction, after completion of the notice 
and opt-out period, to enjoin individual plaintiffs from pursuing 
collateral litigation. 
 
 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) 
(expressing the rule that courts will avoid constitutional 
questions when possible).  In doing so, we offend no principle of 
constitutional law, for the jurisdictional issues in this case 
would not exist but for the certification of this class action. 
Absent the class certification, there is no need for a 
determination of jurisdiction over futures claims, the 
justiciability of such claims, the adequacy of notice, or the 
propriety of a nationwide protective injunction.  Moreover, a 
court need not reach difficult questions of jurisdiction when the 
case can be resolved on some other ground in favor of the same 
party.  See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 528-33 (1976); Elkin 
v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
977 (1992); United States v. Weathersby, 958 F.2d 65, 66 (5th 
Cir. 1992); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
 
II.   APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 Although we deem it wise not to decide most of the 
jurisdictional issues posed by this case, we are obliged to 
consider the threshold question whether we have appellate 
jurisdiction to review the propriety, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, of the district court's class certification. 
 Although the district court has approved the 
stipulation of settlement and certified the Georgine settlement 
class, it has not entered a final judgment because the 
stipulation of settlement is expressly conditioned on the CCR's 
 insurers assuming liability for the settlement.  See supra note 
4.  This is an appeal of the district court's September 22, 1994, 
preliminary injunction, which prohibits Georgine class members 
from pursuing claims for asbestos-related personal injury in any 
other court pending the issuance of a final order.  The district 
court issued the preliminary injunction pursuant to the All-Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§2283, which provide authority to enjoin collateral litigation if 
"necessary in aid" of the court's jurisdiction.  See Gore, 10 
F.3d 189, 201-04 (3d Cir. 1993).  The district court found that 
the injunction is necessary because collateral litigation would 
undermine implementation of the settlement.   
 An order granting or denying class certification is 
generally not appealable until a final order has been issued. See 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (class 
certification not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291); Gardner v. 
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978) (class 
certification not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).  This 
Court has jurisdiction, of course, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
to review the preliminary injunction issued by the district 
court.  We further conclude that we have pendent appellate 
jurisdiction to review class certification. 
 In Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 
1982) (in banc), we held that class certification is reviewable 
on appeal from issuance of a preliminary injunction if "the 
preliminary injunction cannot properly be decided without 
reference to the class certification question."  Id. at 449.  We 
 reasoned that if the propriety of class certification "directly 
controls disposition of the [injunction], or [if] the issues are, 
in some way, inextricably bound[,] then both issues must be 
addressed in order to resolve properly the section 1292(a)(1) 
preliminary injunction."  Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted); accord Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 
186, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1990).  To do otherwise would impinge on the 
right to a 1292(a)(1) appeal.  See Kershner, 670 F.2d at 449. 
 In this case, class certification "directly controls 
disposition of the [injunction]."  The entire basis for the 
district court's injunction is to protect the underlying class 
action.  If the class was not properly certified, the district 
court was without authority to issue its preliminary injunction. 
To give full effect to the appellants' right to review of the 
injunction, we must reach class certification.  We also note that 
concerns that might militate against review are not present in 
this case.  Most notably, there is no indication that the 
district court might alter its class certification order. Compare 
Kershner, 670 F.2d at 449 (expressing this concern). 
 
III.  CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 To obtain class certification, plaintiffs must satisfy 
all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and come within one 
provision of Rule 23(b).  See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
508 F.2d 239, 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011.  Rule 
23(a) mandates a showing of (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) 
typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation: 
 One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 We held in GM Trucks that, although class actions may 
be certified for settlement purposes only, Rule 23(a)'s 
requirements must be satisfied as if the case were going to be 
litigated.  See 55 F.3d 768, 799-800 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. General Motors Corp. v. French, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995). Strict 
application of the criteria is mandated, even when the parties 
have reached a proposed settlement, because 
Rule 23 is designed to assure that courts 
will identify the common interests of class 
members and evaluate the named plaintiff's 
and counsel's ability to fairly and 
adequately protect class interests . . . . To 
allow lower standards for the requisites of 
the rule in the face of the hydraulic 
pressures confronted by courts adjudicating 
very large and complex actions would erode 
the protection afforded by the rule almost 
entirely.   
Id. at 799 (citation omitted).  Therefore, despite the 
possibility that settlement-only class actions might serve the 
"useful purpose of ridding the courts" of the "albatross[]" 
represented by mass tort actions, the rule in this circuit is 
that settlement class certification is not permissible unless the 
case would have been "triable in class form."  Id. 
  In addition to satisfying the Rule 23(a) requirements, 
a putative class must meet the conditions of one of the parts of 
subsection (b).  In this case, the settling parties seek 
certification pursuant to 23(b)(3), which requires findings of 
predominance and superiority -- i.e., "that the questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy."  FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3). 
 In GM Trucks we reserved the question whether, in the 
case of settlement classes,0 the fact of settlement may be 
considered in applying the 23(b)(3) requirements.  55 F.3d at 
796.  The settling parties assert that in contrast to the 23(a) 
factors, which protect absent class members' rights, the 23(b)(3) 
factors promote the "fair and efficient resolution of justice." 
The fact of settlement, they argue, goes to the heart of Rule 
23(b)(3)'s "manageability concerns" and thus must be considered. 
 We disagree.  The 23(b)(3) requirements protect the 
same interests in fairness and efficiency as the 23(a) 
                     
0A settlement class is a device whereby the court postpones 
formal class certification until the parties have successfully 
concluded a settlement.  If settlement negotiations succeed, the 
court certifies the class for settlement purposes only and sends 
a combined notice of the commencement of the class action and the 
settlement to the class members.  By conditionally certifying the 
class for settlement purposes only, the court allows the 
defendant to challenge class certification in the event that the 
settlement falls apart.  For a more detailed description of 
settlement classes and their costs and benefits, see GM Trucks, 
55 F.3d at 786-92. 
 requirements.  More importantly, we based our pronouncement in GM 
Trucks that "a class is a class is a class" in large part on the 
fact that "[t]here is no language in the rule that can be read to 
authorize separate, liberalized criteria for settlement classes." 
Id. at 799.  Whatever the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (and, 
of course, Congress) may ultimately determine the better rule to 
be, we do not believe that the drafters of the present rule 
included a more liberal standard for 23(b)(3).0  
 The district court did not have the benefit of GM 
Trucks when it decided the Rule 23 issues, and it applied an 
incorrect standard.  First, it took the view that Rule 23 
requirements are lower for settlement classes.  See, e.g., 
                     
0
 The settling parties argue that In re School Asbestos Litig., 
789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. 
School Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852, and National Gypsum Co. 
v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 915 (1986), requires the 
Court to take the possibility of settlement into account in 
applying Rule 23(b)(3).  We reject this contention. In re School 
Asbestos Litig. stated, in relevant part:  
 
Concentration of individual damage suits in 
one forum can lead to formidable problems, 
but the realities of litigation should not be 
overlooked in theoretical musings.  Most tort 
cases settle, and the preliminary 
maneuverings in litigation today are designed 
as much, if not more, for settlement purposes 
than for trial.  Settlements of class actions 
often result in savings for all concerned. 
 
Id. at 1009.  This statement, whatever its import, does not 
constitute a holding.  Its language is broad, general, and 
grammatically permissive.  Moreover, this statement appears in a 
section in which the Court does both a Rule 23(a) and 23(b) 
analysis.  Thus, insofar as In re School Asbetos Litig. requires 
a consideration of settlement, this requirement would apply to 
Rule 23(a) as well as 23(b).  But GM Trucks held that Rule 23(a) 
must be applied without reference to settlement, thereby 
rejecting the settling parties' argument. 
 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
("The Rule 23 requirements for class certification . . . are 
often more readily satisfied in the settlement context because 
the issues for resolution by the Court are more limited than in 
the litigation context.").  Second, the district court erred by 
relying in significant part on the presence of the settlement to 
satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation, and the Rule 23(b)(3) 
requirements of predominance and superiority.  See Georgine, 157 
F.R.D. at 314-19.  But each of these requirements must be 
satisfied without taking into account the settlement, and as if 
the action were going to be litigated.  See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 
799. 
 With a proper understanding of the Rule 23 factors, we 
turn now to their application.  For the reasons explained below, 
we conclude that this class, considered as a litigation class, 
cannot meet the 23(a) requirements of typicality and adequacy of 
representation, nor the 23(b) requirements of predominance and 
superiority.0  We will discuss each of these requirements. 
Instead of addressing them in the conventional sequence, we will 
use a functional arrangement, linking related provisions. 
 
A.  Commonality & Predominance 
 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that "there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class," and Rule 23(b)(3) requires "that 
                     
0This class, which may stretch into the millions, easily 
satisfies the numerosity requirement. 
 the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members."  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Because 23(b)(3)'s predominance 
requirement incorporates the commonality requirement, we will 
treat them together. 
 All of the putative class members assert claims based 
on exposure to the asbestos sold by the CCR defendants.  The 
capacity of asbestos fibers to cause physical injury is surely a 
common question, though that issue was settled long ago.  See, 
e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 
479 U.S. 852, and National Gypsum Co. v. School Dist. of 
Lancaster, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).  Although not identified by the 
district court, there may be several other common questions, such 
as whether the defendants had knowledge of the hazards of 
asbestos, whether the defendants adequately tested their asbestos 
products, and whether the warnings accompanying their products 
were adequate.  See id. at 1009.0 
 However, beyond these broad issues, the class members' 
claims vary widely in character.  Class members were exposed to 
different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of 
time, in different ways, and over different periods.  Some class 
members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic 
pleural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling 
                     
0The only common questions identified by the district court are 
(1) the fairness of the settlement -- an impermissible 
consideration -- and (2) the harmfulness of asbestos exposure. 
See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 316. 
 asbestosis, or from mesothelioma -- a disease which, despite a 
latency period of approximately fifteen to forty years, generally 
kills its victims within two years after they become symptomatic. 
Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that 
complicates the causation inquiry. 
 The futures plaintiffs especially share little in 
common, either with each other or with the presently injured 
class members.  It is unclear whether they will contract 
asbestos-related disease and, if so, what disease each will 
suffer.  They will also incur different medical expenses because 
their monitoring and treatment will depend on singular 
circumstances and individual medical histories. 
 These factual differences translate into significant 
legal differences.  Differences in amount of exposure and nexus 
between exposure and injury lead to disparate applications of 
legal rules, including matters of causation, comparative fault, 
and the types of damages available to each plaintiff. 
 Furthermore, because we must apply an individualized 
choice of law analysis to each plaintiff's claims, see Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985) (constitutional 
limitations on choice of law apply even in nationwide class 
actions), the proliferation of disparate factual and legal issues 
is compounded exponentially.  The states have different rules 
governing the whole range of issues raised by the plaintiffs' 
claims:  viability of futures claims; availability of causes of 
action for medical monitoring, increased risk of cancer, and fear 
of future injury; causation; the type of proof necessary to prove 
 asbestos exposure; statutes of limitations; joint and several 
liability; and comparative/contributory negligence.  In short, 
the number of uncommon issues in this humongous class action, 
with perhaps as many as a million class members, is colossal. 
 The settling parties point out that our cases have 
sometimes stated a very low threshold for commonality.  In Neal 
v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994), for example, we stated 
that "[t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the 
named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with 
the grievances of the prospective class."  And, in In re School 
Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 1010, we stated that "the 
'threshold of commonality is not high.'" (citation omitted).  But 
those cases are quite different from this one.  Neal involved a 
class action for injunctive relief, and thus raised infinitely 
fewer individualized issues than are posed here.  And In re 
School Asbestos Litigation upheld the certification of a 
nationwide class action for damages associated with asbestos 
removal explicitly on the ground that case involved only property 
damages.  See, e.g., 789 F.2d at 1009 ("[T]he claims are limited 
to property damage, and school districts are unlikely to have 
strong emotional ties to the litigation.").0  We believe that the 
                     
0Moreover, In re School Asbestos Litigation involved vastly fewer 
individualized questions than this one.  Cf. id. at 1010 (noting 
that the complexity of causation questions in personal injury 
suits is much greater than for property damage suits). And, 
choice of law arguably did not greatly magnify the number of 
disparate issues.  Class counsel had made a credible argument 
that the applicable law of the different states could be broken 
into approximately four patterns, see id., and we noted that the 
district court could decertify the class if this prediction 
 commonality barrier is higher in a personal injury damages class 
action, like this one, that seeks to resolve all issues, 
including noncommon issues, of liability and damages. 
 Nevertheless, we do not hold that this class fails the 
commonality requirement because the test of commonality is 
subsumed by the predominance requirement, which this class cannot 
conceivably meet.  We proceed cautiously here because 
establishing a high threshold for commonality might have 
repercussions for class actions very different from this case, 
such as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class action, in which 
the action presented claimants with their only chance at 
recovery.   
 Turning to predominance, we hold that the limited 
common issues identified, primarily the single question of the 
harmfulness of asbestos, cannot satisfy the predominance 
requirement in this case.  Indeed, it does not even come close. 
We start by noting the Advisory Committee's well-known caution 
against certifying class actions involving mass torts: 
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to 
numerous persons is ordinarily not 
appropriate for a class action because of the 
likelihood that significant questions, not 
only of damages but of liability and defenses 
of liability, would be present, affecting the 
individuals in different ways.  In these 
circumstances an action conducted nominally 
as a class action would degenerate in 
practice into multiple lawsuits separately 
tried. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) Advisory Notes to 1966 Amendment. 
                                                                  
proved to be faulty.  Of course, this case could not be broken 
into anywhere near that small a number of patterns. 
  While, notwithstanding this cautionary note, mass torts 
involving a single accident are sometimes susceptible to Rule 
23(b)(3) class action treatment, the individualized issues can 
become overwhelming in actions involving long-term mass torts 
(i.e., those which do not arise out of a single accident).  As 
the Ninth Circuit stated in In re N.D. Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 
sub nom. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983): 
 In the typical mass tort situation, such 
as an airplane crash or a cruise ship food 
poisoning, proximate cause can be determined 
on a class-wide basis because the cause of 
the common disaster is the same for each of 
the plaintiffs. 
 
 In products liability actions, however, 
individual issues may outnumber common 
issues.  No single happening or accident 
occurs to cause similar types of physical 
harm or property damage.  No one set of 
operative facts establishes liability.  No 
single proximate cause applies equally to 
each potential class member and each 
defendant.  Furthermore, the alleged 
tortfeasor's affirmative defenses (such as 
failure to follow directions, assumption of 
the risk, contributory negligence, and the 
statute of limitations) may depend on facts 
peculiar to each plaintiff's case. 
Id. at 853 (citations omitted).   
 Other cases are in accord.  See, e.g., Sterling v. 
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) ("In 
complex, mass, toxic tort accidents, where no one set of 
operative facts establishes liability, no single proximate cause 
equally applies to each potential class member and each 
defendant, and individual issues outnumber common issues, the 
 district court should properly question the appropriateness of a 
class action for resolving the controversy."); cf. Watson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. 1992) (approving a 
class of some 18,000 plaintiffs injured in an oil refinery 
explosion but noting that "[t]his litigation differs markedly 
from toxic tort cases such as Jenkins, Fibreboard, and 
Tetracycline, in which numerous plaintiffs suffer varying types 
of injury at different times and through different causal 
mechanisms, thereby creating many separate issues"), reh'g 
granted, 990 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993), appeal dismissed, 53 F.3d 
663 (5th Cir. 1994).  These concerns recently led the Sixth 
Circuit to decertify a nationwide class action for injuries 
caused by penile prostheses.  See In re American Medical Sys., 
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1081 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Proofs as to strict 
liability, negligence, failure to warn, breach of express and 
implied warranties will also vary from plaintiff to plaintiff 
because complications with an AMS device may be due to a variety 
of factors . . . ."). 
 Although some courts have approved class certification 
of long-term mass torts, these cases have generally involved the 
centrality of a single issue.  See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1987) (expressing 
concern over the difficulties of managing mass tort suits but 
finding that class certification was justified because of the 
centrality of the military contractor defense), cert. denied sub 
nom. Pinkney v. Dow Chem. Co., 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re A.H. 
Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 747 (4th Cir.) ("Just as the 
 military [contractor] defense was central to the case in Agent 
Orange, so the question whether Aetna was a joint tortfeasor here 
was the critical issue common to all the cases against Aetna, and 
one which, if not established, would dispose of the entire 
litigation."), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Aetna Casualty 
and Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).  This case, of course, lacks 
any single central issue. 
 The lack of predominant common issues has been a 
particular problem in asbestos-related class actions.  For 
example, in In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990), 
the Fifth Circuit stated: 
 The 2,990 [asbestos personal injury] 
class members cannot be certified for trial 
as proposed under Rule 23(b)(3).  Rule 
23(b)(3) requires that "the questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting 
individual members."  There are too many 
disparities among the various plaintiffs for 
their common concerns to predominate.  The 
plaintiffs suffer from different diseases, 
some of which are more likely to have been 
caused by asbestos than others.  The 
plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos in 
various manners and to varying degrees.  The 
plaintiffs' lifestyles differed in material 
respects.  To create the requisite 
commonality for trial, the discrete 
components of the class members' claims and 
the asbestos manufacturers' defenses must be 
submerged.  
Id. at 712 (citations omitted).  In In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269 
(11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit expressed similar 
concerns: 
Although the record on commonality and 
typicality of the class is sparse, the 
district court's order on its face 
encompasses a potentially wide variety of 
 different conditions caused by numerous 
different types of exposures.  We have no 
indication that claimants' experiences share 
any factors other than asbestos and Raymark 
in common. 
Id. at 1273 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 We also draw instruction from Yandle v. PPG Indus., 
Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974), where the district court 
refused to certify a much more narrowly circumscribed asbestos 
class action -- one brought by former employees of an asbestos 
plant.  The court stated: 
 [T]he Pittsburgh Corning plant was in 
operation in Tyler for a ten year period, 
during which some 570 persons were employed 
for different periods of time.  These 
employees worked in various positions at the 
plant, and some were exposed to greater 
concentrations of asbestos dust than were 
others.  Of these employees it is only 
natural that some may have had occupational 
diseases when they entered their employment 
for Pittsburgh Corning.  There are other 
issues that will be peculiar to each 
plaintiff and will predominate in this case, 
such as:  The employee's knowledge and 
appreciation of the danger of breathing 
asbestos dust and further, whether the 
employee was given a respirator and whether 
he used it or refused to use it. . . . 
 
 Additionally, the plaintiffs have 
asserted various theories of recovery against 
the defendants, and the nine defendants have 
alleged differing affirmative defenses 
against the plaintiffs.  For example, the 
statute of limitations may bar some 
plaintiffs, but not others.  During the ten 
year period the state of medical knowledge 
was changing, which has a significant bearing 
on the defendants' duty to warn of dangers. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, 
the Court is convinced that the number of 
uncommon questions of law and fact would 
predominate over the common questions, and 
the case would therefore 'degenerate . . . 
into multiple lawsuits separately tried.'  
 Id. at 570-71.   
 Many of the cases cited by the settling parties in 
support of class certification are distinguishable because they 
involved only partial certification of common issues.  See 
Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 184 
(4th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he district court exercised its discretion 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) and 23(c)(4)(A) to certify the 
class conditionally . . . on eight common issues."); Jenkins v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir.) ("Accordingly, 
[the district court] certified the class as to the common 
questions, ordering them resolved for the class by a class action 
jury."), reh'g denied, 785 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986); Payton v. 
Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 386 (D. Mass. 1979) (certifying class 
as to limited common issues), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 
1983).  Other cases relied on by the settling parties are mass 
tort cases where it appeared possible to try a number of common 
issues and leave the individual issues to trials of small groups 
of plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 
F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[I]ndividual members of the 
class still will be required to submit evidence concerning their 
particularized damage claims in subsequent proceedings.").  These 
cases did not seek to resolve anywhere near the number of 
individual issues presented in this case. 
 In view of the factors set forth at pages 35-36, and 
for the reasons stated on pages 36-42, we conclude that this 
class fails the test of predominance.  Even if we were to assume 
that some issues common to the class beyond the essentially 
 settled question of the harmfulness of asbestos exposure remain, 
the huge number of important individualized issues overwhelm any 
common questions.  Given the multiplicity of individualized 
factual and legal issues, magnified by choice of law 
considerations, we can by no means conclude "that the questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members." 
 
B.  Adequacy of Representation 
 Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  The adequacy of representation inquiry 
has two components designed to ensure that absentees' interests 
are fully pursued.  First, the interests of the named plaintiffs 
must be sufficiently aligned with those of the absentees.  GM 
Trucks, 55 F.3d at 800.  This component includes an inquiry into 
potential conflicts among various members of the class, see id. 
at 800-01, because the named plaintiffs' interests cannot align 
with those of absent class members if the interests of different 
class members are not themselves in alignment.  Second, class 
counsel must be qualified and must serve the interests of the 
entire class.  Id. at 801. 
 Although questions have been raised concerning the 
second prong of the inquiry, we do not resolve them here.  As we 
have briefly noted above, the objectors have forcefully argued 
that class counsel cannot adequately represent the class because 
of a conflict of interest.  In the eyes of the objectors, class 
 counsel have brought a collusive action on behalf of the CCR 
defendants after having been paid over $200 million to settle 
their inventory of previously filed cases.  The objectors also 
adduce evidence that class counsel, as part of the settlement, 
have abjured any intention to litigate the claims of any futures 
plaintiffs.  These allegations are, of course, rife with ethical 
overtones, which have been vigorously debated in the academy. See 
Symposium, Mass Tortes:  Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 Cornell L. 
Rev. 811 (1995).  However, Judge Reed resolved this issue in 
favor of class counsel largely on the basis of fact findings that 
the objectors have not challenged.  See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 
326-330. 
 As to the first prong of the inquiry, however, we 
conclude that serious intra-class conflicts preclude this class 
from meeting the adequacy of representation requirement.  The 
district court is certainly correct that "the members of the 
class are united in seeking the maximum possible recovery for 
their asbestos-related claims."  Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 317 
(citation omitted).  But the settlement does more than simply 
provide a general recovery fund.  Rather, it makes important 
judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different 
kinds of plaintiffs, decisions that necessarily favor some 
claimants over others.  For example, under the settlement many 
kinds of claimants (e.g., those with asymptomatic pleural 
thickening) get no monetary award at all.  The settlement makes 
no provision for medical monitoring or for payment for loss of 
consortium.  The back-end opt out is limited to a few persons per 
 year.  The settlement relegates those who are unlucky enough to 
contract mesothelioma in ten or fifteen years to a modest 
recovery, whereas the average recovery of mesothelioma plaintiffs 
in the tort system runs into the millions of dollars.  In short, 
the settlement makes numerous decisions on which the interests of 
different types of class members are at odds. 
 The most salient conflict in this class action is 
between the presently injured and futures plaintiffs.  As 
rational actors, those who are not yet injured would want reduced 
current payouts (through caps on compensation awards and limits 
on the number of claims that can be paid each year).  The futures 
plaintiffs should also be interested in protection against 
inflation, in not having preset limits on how many cases can be 
handled, and in limiting the ability of defendant companies to 
exit the settlement.  Moreover, in terms of the structure of the 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism established by the 
settlement, they should desire causation provisions that can keep 
pace with changing science and medicine, rather than freezing in 
place the science of 1993.  Finally, because of the difficulty in 
forecasting what their futures hold, they would probably desire a 
delayed opt out like the one employed in Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 
143 F.R.D. 141, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (heart valve settlement 
allows claimants who ultimately experience heart valve fracture 
to reject guaranteed compensation and sue for damages at that 
time). 
 In contrast, those who are currently injured would 
rationally want to maximize current payouts.  Furthermore, 
 currently injured plaintiffs would care little about inflation-
protection.  The delayed opt out desired by futures plaintiffs 
would also be of little interest to the presently injured; 
indeed, their interests are against such an opt out as the more 
people locked into the settlement, the more likely it is to 
survive.0  In sum, presently injured class representatives cannot 
adequately represent the futures plaintiffs' interests and vice 
versa. 
 This conflict (as well as other conflicts among 
different types of claimants) precludes a finding of adequacy of 
representation.  The class is not unlike the one in GM Trucks, 
where a conflict between individual and fleet truck owners 
prevented a finding of adequacy of representation.  See GM 
Trucks, 55 F.3d at 801 ("[W]e must be concerned that the 
individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of 
the government entities; they could skew the terms of the 
settlement to their own benefit."). 
 Absent structural protections to assure that 
differently situated plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique 
interests, the fact that plaintiffs of different types were among 
the named plaintiffs does not rectify the conflict.  This 
principle was explained by the Second Circuit in In re Joint 
                     
0The conflict between futures and presently injured plaintiffs is 
obvious.  Consider, for example, the deposition testimony of 
representative plaintiff Anna Baumgartner, whose husband died of 
mesothelioma.  She testified that the "pleurals," i.e., people 
who suffer only pleural thickening, and who remain uncompensated 
under the settlement, "don't deserve to be compensated by 
anyone," despite the fact that such plaintiffs currently win 
large awards in the tort system. 
 Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721 (2d 
Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 
1993), a case arising out of the Manville Bankruptcy 
reorganization.  In addressing a conflict created by placing both 
asbestos victims and co-defendant manufacturers in the same 
subclass, the court observed, "Their interests are profoundly 
adverse to each other.  The health claimants wish to receive as 
much as possible from the co-defendant manufacturers, and the 
latter wish to hold their payment obligations to a minimum."  Id. 
at 739.  The court concluded, 
The class representatives may well have 
thought that the Settlement serves the 
aggregate interests of the entire class.  But 
the adversity among subgroups requires that 
the members of each subgroup cannot be bound 
to a settlement except by consents given by 
those who understand that their role is to 
represent solely the members of their 
respective subgroups. 
 
Id. at 743.  The lack of any structural protections in this case 
thwarted the adequate representation of the disparate groups of 
plaintiffs. 
 
C.  Typicality 
 Typicality requires that "the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class."  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  The typicality requirement is 
intended to preclude certification of those cases where the legal 
theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those 
of the absentees.  See Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 
 1994); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Weinstein v. Eisenberg, 474 U.S. 946, and 
Wasserstrom v. Eisenberg, 474 U.S. 946, and Pelino, Wasserstrom, 
Chucas and Monteverde, P.C. v. Eisenberg, 474 U.S. 946 (1985). 
The inquiry assesses whether the named plaintiffs have incentives 
that align with those of absent class members so that the 
absentees' interests will be fairly represented.  See Neal, 43 
F.3d at 57.    
 Some commentators believe that the concepts of 
commonality and typicality merge.  See 7A Charles A. Wright, et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1764, at 243-47 (1986). 
Both criteria, to be sure, seek to assure that the action can be 
practically and efficiently maintained and that the interests of 
the absentees will be fairly and adequately represented.  See 
General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 
(1982).  But despite their similarity, commonality and typicality 
are distinct requirements under Rule 23.  See Hassine v. Jeffes, 
846 F.2d 169, 176 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) ("'[C]ommonality' like 
'numerosity' evaluates the sufficiency of the class itself, and 
'typicality' like 'adequacy of representation' evaluates the 
sufficiency of the named plaintiff . . . ."); Weiss v. York 
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 810 n.36 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1060, and cert. denied sub nom. Medical and Dental Staff of 
York Hospital v. Weiss, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).  We think that 
typicality is more akin to adequacy of representation:  both look 
to the potential for conflicts in the class. 
  As our discussion of commonality and predominance make 
clear, this class is a hodgepodge of factually as well as legally 
different plaintiffs.  Moreover, as our discussion of adequacy of 
representation shows, these differences create problematic 
conflicts of interest among different members of the class. These 
problems lead us to hold that no set of representatives can be 
"typical" of this class.  Even though the named plaintiffs 
include a fairly representative mix of futures and injured 
plaintiffs, the underlying lack of commonality and attendant 
conflicts necessarily destroy the possibility of typicality.  See 
In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th 
Cir. 1996) ("[W]e know from the amended complaint that each 
plaintiff used a different model, and each experienced a distinct 
difficulty. . . .  These allegations fail to establish a claim 
typical to each other, let alone a class.").  The claims of the 
named futures plaintiffs are not typical of the injured class 
members, and, conversely, the claims of the named injured 
plaintiffs are not typical of the futures class members. 
 Even if this class included only futures plaintiffs, we 
would be skeptical that any representative could be deemed 
typical of the class.  In addition to the problems created by 
differences in medical monitoring costs, the course of each 
plaintiff's future is completely uncertain.  As we pointed out in 
our discussion of commonality, some plaintiffs may ultimately 
contract mesothelioma, some may get asbestosis, some will suffer 
less serious diseases, and some will incur little or no physical 
impairments.  Given these uncertainties, which will ultimately 
 turn into vastly different outcomes, the futures plaintiffs share 
too little in common to generate a typical representative.  It is 
simply impossible to say that the legal theories of named 
plaintiffs are not in conflict with those of the absentees, see 
Neal, 43 F.3d at 57; Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d 
Cir. 1985), or that the named plaintiffs have incentives that 
align with those of absent class members, see Neal, 43 F.3d at 
57. 
 
D.  Superiority 
 Rule 23(b)(3) requires, in addition to predominance, 
"that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  The rule asks us to balance, in terms of 
fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against 
those of "alternative available methods" of adjudication.  See 
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).  We conclude that in 
this case a class action has serious problems, which, when 
compared to other means of adjudication, are not outweighed by 
its advantages. 
 The proposed class action suffers serious problems in 
both efficiency and fairness.  In terms of efficiency, a class of 
this magnitude and complexity could not be tried.  There are 
simply too many uncommon issues, and the number of class members 
is surely too large.  Considered as a litigation class, then, the 
 difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this 
action are insurmountable.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).0 
 This class action also suffers from serious problems in 
the fairness it accords to the plaintiffs.  Each plaintiff has a 
significant interest in individually controlling the prosecution 
of separate actions.  See supra note 15 (FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3)(A)).  This is not a case where "the amounts at stake for 
individuals [are] so small that separate suits would be 
impracticable."  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) Advisory Notes to 1966 
Amendment.  Rather, this action involves claims for personal 
injury and death -- claims that have a significant impact on the 
lives of the plaintiffs and that frequently receive huge awards 
in the tort system.  See Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 
566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974) ("[T]he court finds that the members of 
the purported class have a vital interest in controlling their 
own litigation because it involves serious personal injuries and 
death in some cases.").  Plaintiffs have a substantial stake in 
making individual decisions on whether and when to settle. 
                     
0Rule 23(b)(3) specifically directs the court to consider: 
 
(A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent 
and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already commenced by or against 
members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to 
be encountered in the management of a class 
action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
  Furthermore, in this class action, plaintiffs may 
become bound to the settlement even if they are unaware of the 
class action or lack sufficient information to evaluate it. 
Problems in adequately notifying and informing exposure-only 
plaintiffs of what is at stake in this class action may be 
insurmountable.  First, exposure-only plaintiffs may not know 
that they have been exposed to asbestos within the terms of this 
class action.  Many, especially the spouses of the occupationally 
exposed, may have no knowledge of the exposure.  For example, 
class representatives LaVerne Winbun and Nafssica Kekrides did 
not learn that their husbands had been occupationally exposed to 
asbestos until the men contracted mesothelioma.  Second, class 
members who know of their exposure but manifest no physical 
disease may pay little attention to class action announcements. 
Without physical injuries, people are unlikely to be on notice 
that they can give up causes of action that have not yet accrued. 
Third, even if class members find out about the class action and 
realize they fall within the class definition, they may lack 
adequate information to properly evaluate whether to opt out of 
the settlement.0 
 To amplify, the fairness concerns created by the 
difficulties in providing adequate notice are especially serious 
because exposure-only plaintiffs may eventually contract a fatal 
                     
0Of course, these concerns would be alleviated to the extent the 
class action provided for an opt-in rather than opt-out 
procedure, or allowed plaintiffs to opt-out after they contract a 
disease.  But this case, encompassing a huge number of futures 
plaintiffs, is an opt-out class action in which back-ended opt 
outs are greatly limited. 
 disease, mesothelioma, from only incidental exposure to asbestos. 
Although only a small fraction of exposure-only plaintiffs will 
develop mesothelioma, the disease is presently always fatal, 
generally within two years of diagnosis.  Prior to death, 
mesothelioma victims invariably suffer great pain and disability. 
Mesothelioma can be caused by slight and incidental exposure to 
asbestos fibers.  The disease has been known to occur in persons 
who lived with an asbestos-exposed parent, or in household 
members who washed the clothes of people who worked with 
asbestos.  Unlike other asbestos-related cancers, mesothelioma 
has only one medically established cause:  asbestos exposure. The 
unpredictability of mesothelioma is further exacerbated by the 
long latency period between exposure to asbestos and the onset of 
the disease, typically between fifteen to forty years. As a 
result, persons contracting the disease today may have little or 
no knowledge or memory of being exposed.  It is unrealistic to 
expect every individual with incidental exposure to asbestos to 
realize that he or she could someday contract a deadly disease 
and make a reasoned decision about whether to stay in this class 
action. 
 We make no decision on whether the Constitution or Rule 
23 prohibits binding futures plaintiffs to a 23(b)(3) opt-out 
class action.  However, it is obvious that if this class action 
settlement were approved, some plaintiffs would be bound despite 
a complete lack of knowledge of the existence or terms of the 
class action.  It is equally obvious that this situation raises 
serious fairness concerns.  Thus, a class action would need 
 significant advantages over alternative means of adjudication 
before it could become a "superior" way to resolve this case. See 
Yandle, 65 F.R.D. at 572 (stating, as a reason the superiority 
requirement was not satisfied, that "because of the nature of the 
injuries claimed, there may be persons that might neglect to 
'opt-out' of the class, and then discover some years in the 
future that they have contracted asbestosis, lung cancer or other 
pulmonary disease").  
 These advantages are lacking here.  Although individual 
trials for all claimants may be wholly inefficient, that is not 
the only alternative.  A series of statewide or more narrowly 
defined adjudications, either through consolidation under Rule 
42(a) or as class actions under Rule 23, would seem preferable. 
See also William W Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: 
Should Rule 23 Be Revised?, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1250, 1264 (1996) 
("These alternatives 'are hardly confined to the class action, on 
the one side, and individual uncoordinated lawsuits, on the 
other.'") (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee:  1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 386 (1967)). 
 
E.  Summary and Observations 
 We have concluded that the class certified by the 
district court cannot pass muster under Rule 23 because it fails 
the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of 
Rule 23(a), as well as the predominance and superiority 
requirements of Rule 23(b).  Indeed, GM Trucks requires an order 
 of vacatur on these facts.  Moreover, we cannot conceive of how 
any class of this magnitude could be certified. 
 The desirability of innovation in the management of 
mass tort litigation does not escape the collective judicial 
experience of the panel.  But reform must come from the policy-
makers, not the courts.  Such reform efforts are not, needless to 
say, without problems, and it is unclear through what mechanism 
such reform might best be effected.  The most direct and 
encompassing solution would be legislative action.  The Congress, 
after appropriate study and hearings, might authorize the kind of 
class action that would facilitate the global settlement sought 
here.  Although we have not adjudicated the due process issues 
raised, we trust that Congress would deal with futures claims in 
a way that would maximize opt-out rights and minimize due process 
concerns that could undermine its work.  On the other hand, 
congressional inhospitability to class actions, as reflected in 
the recently enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), and by its 
recently expressed concern about the workload of the federal 
courts, might not bode well for such a prospect. 
 In a different vein, Congress might enact compensation-
like statutes dealing with particular mass torts.0 Alternatively, 
Congress might enact a statute that would deal with choice of law 
in mass tort cases, and provide that one set of laws would apply 
                     
0For example, Judge Weinstein calls for a broad compensatory 
legal framework to give mass tort victims a means of recovery 
independent of tort law.  See Jack B. Weinstein, Individual 
Justice in Mass Tort Litigation (1995). 
 to all cases within a class, at least on issues of liability.  
Such legislation could do more to simplify (and facilitate) mass 
tort litigation than anything else we can imagine. 
 Another route would be an amendment to the Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23.  We are aware that the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is in fact studying Rule 23, 
including the matter of settlement classes.  One approach the 
Rules Committee might pursue would be to amend Rule 23 to provide 
that settlement classes need not meet the requirements of 
litigation classes.  The Rules Committee, of course, should 
minimize due process concerns, but it might address them via opt-
in classes, or by classes with greater opt-out rights, so as to 
avoid possible due process problems. 
 The Rules Committee might also consider incorporating, 
as an element of certification, a test, akin to preliminary 
injunction analysis, that balances the probable outcome on the 
merits against the burdens imposed by class certification.  This 
kind of balancing might engender confidence in the integrity of 
classes thus developed.  But this approach has problems too, not 
only in terms of the potential for satellite litigation, but also 
in terms of the impact of the threshold decision on the outcome 
of the case. 
 Perhaps this case, with its rich matrix of factual and 
legal issues, will serve as a calipers by which the various 
proposals before the Rules Committee might be measured.  While we 
hope that these observations are useful, we express doubts that 
anything less than statutory revisions effecting wholesale 
 changes in the law of mass torts could justify certification of 
this humongous class.  In short, we think that what the district 
court did here might be ordered by a legislature, but should not 
have been ordered by a court.   
 The order of the district court certifying the 
plaintiff class will be vacated and the case remanded to the 
district court with directions to decertify the class.  The 
injunction granted by the district court will also be vacated.   
The parties will bear their own costs. 
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HARRY W. WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
 I fully subscribe to the decision of Judge Becker that 
the plaintiffs in this case have not met the requirements of Rule 
23.  I have some reservations, however, about any intimation that 
Congress might or should enact compensation-like statutes to deal 
with mass torts or that we approve any suggestion of Judge 
Weinstein "for a broad compensatory legal framework to give mass 
tort victims a means of recovery independent of tort law."  See 
n.17.  I concur in the observation, however, that Rule 23 might 
be amended to aid in the process of mass settlement in the class 
action context. 
 I am of the view, moreover, that the "futures claims" 
presented by certain plaintiffs, as described in the court's 
opinion, do not confer standing to these exposure only 
plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs of this type do not claim presently to 
suffer from any clinically diagnosable asbestos-related 
condition; they merely assert that they were exposed to asbestos 
fibers at some time in the past.  In Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), we were reminded that federal 
courts under the Constitution have jurisdiction to consider only 
real cases and controversies.  Id. at 559.  At a minimum, 
standing requires: 
First, the plaintiff must have 
suffered an "injury in fact"--an 
 invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, see id., at 756; 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 
(1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727, 740-741, n.16 (1972); and 
(b) "actual or imminent, not 
`conjectural' or `hypothetical,'" 
Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
102 (1983)).  Second, there must be 
a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained 
of--the injury has to be "fairly . 
. . trace[able] to the challenged 
action of the defendant, and not . 
. . th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third 
party not before the court."  Simon 
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 
(1976).  Third, it must be 
"likely," as opposed to merely 
"speculative," that the injury will 
be "redressed by a favorable 
decision." 
 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (footnote omitted). 
 Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing federal 
jurisdiction and their standing to proceed.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561; FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975).  I do not believe exposure only 
plaintiffs have demonstrated any "injury in fact" as of the time 
of filing.  Furthermore, I would conclude that such plaintiffs 
have not presented a "likely" as opposed to a mere "speculative," 
current injury that could be redressed at trial.  The court's 
decision in such a case would necessarily be conjectural at best. 
Fear and apprehension about a possible future physical or medical 
consequence of exposure to asbestos is not enough to establish an 
 injury in fact.  I do not believe that Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), a case 
involving actual nuclear power emissions, supports the 
plaintiffs' position.  The case, moreover, did not contain claims 
for money damages.  Nor does Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 
(1993), constitute precedent on which these plaintiffs can rely 
to support standing.  Helling involved a plaintiff who was 
continuously exposed to tobacco smoke in limited quarters and 
claimed that he had certain health problems caused by exposure to 
cigarette smoke and that he feared further injury if he continued 
to be exposed involuntarily to this hazard.  Id. at 2478. 
Standing was not discussed by the Supreme Court, nor by the court 
of appeals (see Helling, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991)), 
presumably because the plaintiff claimed present injury. 
 In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation (Ivy 
v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co.), 996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994), may suggest to the 
contrary, but I would adopt here a prudential limitation on 
standing, under these particular circumstances, as to exposure 
only plaintiffs who have not yet manifested a distinct and 
palpable injury-in-fact.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: 
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Col. Law Rev. 1343, 
1422-1433 (1995).  I do not intimate that prudence would always 
preclude any and all suits by "future claimants" who have been 
exposed to some calamitous occurrence or substance.  This view in 
this case is supported by the testimony of the plaintiffs 
themselves.  The exposure only class representatives admitted 
 under oath that they would not have continued with the litigation 
in the absence of a settlement.  Robert Georgine responded to 
questioning: 
Q.Have you ever 
gone to a 
lawyer for your 
own personal 
reasons to file 
a claim for 
yourself? 
 
A.No. 
 
Q.--for 
asbestos 
related injury? 
 
A.No. 
 
Q.And why is 
that? 
 
A.I haven't had 
a problem. 
 
Q.Is that still 
true today? 
That you 
haven't had a 
problem? 
 
A.Well, I 
don't--I 
breathe normal-
-I don't have 
any problems 
that I'm aware 
of. That's not 
to say that one 
can't develop. 
 
Q.Oh, I 
understand 
that. 
 
A.Okay. 
 
 Q.And God 
forbid, I hope 
nothing ever 
does develop, 
but until you 
develop an 
asbestos-
related 
problem, you 
have no 
intention of 
filing a 
lawsuit for 
damages, do 
you? 
 
A.Other than 
the present--
present case? 
 
Q.Well, in the 
present case, 
do you believe 
that the 
asbestos 
companies owe 
you money?  M-
O-N-E-Y. 
 
A.Owe me 
personally? 
 
Q.Yes. 
 
A.I believe 
that if there 
was anything 
that happened 
to my lungs 
that was 
asbestos-
related, that 
they would owe 
me money, yes. 
 
Q.But as of 
today, nothing 
has happened to 
your lungs 
that's 
asbestos-
 related that 
you know of? 
 
. . . . 
 
A.For myself, 
that's right. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q.As you sit 
here today, you 
are not 
suffering any 
emotional 
distress 
because you 
might come down 
with an 
asbestos-- 
 
A.No, I am not. 
I am not. 
 
J/A 1204-06 (emphasis added).  At the fairness hearing, Ambrose 
Vogt testified similarly: 
 
Q.Now, prior to 
your 
participation 
in this class 
action, you had 
never consulted 
with a lawyer 
for the purpose 
of filing a 
claim as a 
result of your 
asbestos 
exposure, isn't 
that right? 
 
A.Yes. 
 
 Q.You testified 
under oath on 
January 12th, 
1994, that you 
were not 
seeking money 
damages at the 
time that you 
agreed to be a 
class 
representative 
in this case, 
and at the time 
that the 
lawsuit was 
filed?  You 
testified that 
way under oath 
then, isn't 
that correct? 
 
A.Yes. 
 
Q.And that was 
true then, is 
that right? 
 
A.Yes. 
 
Q.And it is 
true today, it 
is not, you are 
not seeking 
money damages 
today? 
 
A.Not today, 
no. 
 
Id. at 1280-81.  At his deposition, class representative Ty Annas 
also made clear that he would not have brought suit had it not 
been for the settlement.  Id. at 1179.  On cross-examination, 
Annas stated: 
Q.As of today, 
can you think 
of any out-of-
pocket loss 
 that you've had 
as a result of 
your exposure 
to asbestos? 
 
A.Not from 
mine. 
 
Q.So, Mr. 
Annas, would it 
be fair to say 
that you don't 
believe you've 
lost any money 
at all as a 
result of your 
exposure to 
asbestos? 
 
A.No, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q.So you, on 
January 15, 
1993, had no 
interest in 
recovering 
money for 
yourself from 
the asbestos 
companies; is 
that right? 
 
A.Yes. 
 
Id. at 1178-79.  At the fairness hearing, Mr. Annas reiterated 
even more clearly that he did not seek damages of any kind from 
the CCR defendants: 
Q.At deposition 
you testified 
that as of 
January 15th, 
1993 that you 
hadn't 
authorized 
anybody to sue 
for money for 
 yourself 
because of your 
asbestos 
exposure, is 
that right? 
 
A.That's right. 
 
Q.And that is 
correct today? 
A.Yes, sir. 
 
Q.And when you 
appeared at 
deposition, you 
testified I 
believe that 
you got 
involved in 
this case in 
order to help 
to get the case 
resolved and to 
help people 
before the 
money runs out, 
is that 
correct? 
 
A.That's my 
statement. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q.If they're 
[people exposed 
to asbestos] 
not impaired 
they should 
receive no 
compensation 
whatsoever? 
 
A.That's my 
feelings. 
 
Id. at 1269-72.  Representative plaintiffs Timothy Murphy and 
Carlos Raver also stated emphatically that they were not seeking 
 damages of any kind at the time the complaint was filed.  At his 
deposition, Murphy testified as follows: 
Q.Let's go 
back, let's 
say, a month in 
time, prior to 
the 
communication 
that you had 
with Mr. 
Weingarten 
[counsel for 
Greitzer & 
Locks] three or 
four weeks ago. 
Before that 
communication, 
did you know 
what it was 
that you were 
claiming in 
this lawsuit? 
 
A.I know what 
I--that I 
claimed that I 
was 
occupationally 
exposed to 
asbestos over a 
long period of 
time. 
 
Q.Did you know 
that you were 
claiming money 
damages? 
 
A.No. 
 
Q.To this day, 
do you believe 
you are 
claiming money 
damages in this 
case? 
 
A.No. 
 
 Q.So you are 
not seeking any 
recovery in 
terms of money 
damages in this 
case; is that 
right? 
 
A.No.  Not at 
this time. 
 
Id. at 1124 (emphasis added).  Raver testified to the same 
effect: 
 
Q.Did you 
conclude in 
1991, sir, that 
based on your 
physical 
condition at 
that time that 
you, in your 
words, didn't 
deserve any 
money and 
didn't need any 
money?  Was 
that a decision 
that you made? 
 
A.Yes, sir. 
 
Q.When you 
filed this 
lawsuit, the 
one that was 
filed in 
January of 
1993, at the 
time that you 
filed the 
lawsuit, had 
you decided 
that based on 
your condition 
at that time 
that you didn't 
deserve any 
money and 
didn't want any 
 money at that 
time? 
 
A.That's true, 
sir.  I didn't 
want any money 
at that time. 
Still don't 
want any money. 
 
Id. at 1147-49.  These representative plaintiffs clearly conceded 
at the fairness hearing that, absent the settlement, they did not 
intend to pursue the claims in the class complaint.  They claimed 
no damages and no present injury.  I would hold, accordingly, 
that the exposure only plaintiffs had no standing to pursue this 
class action suit. 
 I concur in the court's decision to reverse the 
district court, vacate the order certifying the plaintiff class, 
and remand with instructions to vacate the injunction.  I would 
also hold further that exposure only plaintiffs have no standing 
to pursue their claims.  
